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PROGRAMS (MDAP)K. J. Euske, Joseph San Miguel and Chong WangABSTRACT
This research examines how the cost performance of defense contracts
varies among the Air Force, Army, Navy, and the Department of Defense
(DoD) and among five major defense contractors: Boeing, Lockheed
Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics. Data for
these analyses was extracted from the recently established Defense
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) web-based
interface for management information on Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAP). Note that, in addition to the three military services,
MDAP data is also reported for DoD itself.Advances in Management Accounting, Volume 20, 75–100
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K. J. EUSKE ET AL.76Data analysis indicates that the Navy ranks last among the military
services and DoD in cost performance for MDAP contracts, while the Air
Force ranks best. Of the defense contractors, Raytheon ranks last in cost
performance and General Dynamics is next to last. Furthermore, the
Navy contracts more frequently with Raytheon and General Dynamics
than do the other services or DoD. Explanatory factors for poor cost
performance may be due to factors such as the Navy’s lack of oversight,
the quality of the acquisition workforce, the defense contractors’ cost
inefficiency, ethical lapses, or weak corporate governance, or combina-
tions of these factors.
In addition, the schedule performance data was also identified. Tests of
statistical significance on the schedule performance difference generally
yield no results except for one relationship which indicates that the Navy
is more likely to have Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) schedule
breaches than its counterparts. Finally, cost performance data is
examined for statistically significant differences between the two major
categories of defense contracts: fixed-price contracts and cost-plus
contracts. However, no significant findings were discovered.
Keywords: Cost variance; cost performance index; schedule
performance index; APB breaches; Nunn-McCurdy breachesINTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of the defense budget1 during President George W. Bush’s
administration is not likely to be repeated soon. The proposed Department
of Defense (DoD) budget for fiscal 2011 is $549 billion, an increase of only
1.8% over fiscal 2010. The 2010 total dollar increase in the DoD budget was
2.1% higher than fiscal 2009. The diminishing rate of budget growth is a
response to America’s difficult economic situation and rising fiscal deficit.
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates called for improved cost efficiency
within an increasingly resource-constrained environment.2 Lately, a series of
legislative and executive actions have been taken to address cost inefficiency3
believed to be widespread in DoD, especially for Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAP).4 For example, on March 4, 2009, President Barack
Obama issued the ‘‘Memorandum on Government Contracting’’ urging
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practices and contracting performance. On the legislative side, the most
notable event was the passage of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform
Act (WSARA), which was unanimously supported by Congress and signed
into law by President Obama on May 22, 2009. On January 6, 2011,
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced a series of efficiency
decisions designed to save the DoD more than $150 billion over the next five
years primarily by reducing overhead costs, improving business practices,
and culling excess or troubled programs. Gates said:
Meeting real-world requirements. Doing right by our people. Reducing excess. Being
more efficient. Squeezing costs. Setting priorities and sticking to them. Making tough
choices. These are all things that we should do as a Department and as a military
regardless of the time and circumstance. But they are more important than ever at a time
of extreme fiscal duress, when budget pressures and scrutiny fall on all areas of
government, including defense.
In summary, there is a consensus among Congress, White House, and
Pentagon officials that the defense acquisition system needs major reforms
to improve cost efficiency.
Motivated by the ongoing defense acquisition reforms mentioned above,
we investigate the cross-sectional variation in cost performance among
different service departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and among
major defense contractors (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman,
Raytheon, and General Dynamics). Using contract and contractor
information for MDAPs contained in Defense Acquisition Management
Information Retrieval (DAMIR), we document that the Navy has the worst
cost performance among the major service departments, while the Air
Force is the best performer. Out of the five major defense contractors,
Raytheon significantly underperforms other contractors in cost efficiency,
followed by General Dynamics. Moreover, the Navy contracts more often
with Raytheon and General Dynamics than the other services. So it is not
clear if the Navy’s underperformance is due to factors such as its lack of
oversight, the quality of acquisition workforce, or because the Navy
contracts more often with contractors with lower cost efficiency, low ethical
standards, or weak corporate governance, or combinations of these factors.
And this unanswered question is a potential topic for future research.
In addition, we examine how schedule performance varies across
military services and major defense contractors. Most often the results
are not statistically significant. One exception is that there is some evidence
K. J. EUSKE ET AL.78suggesting that the Navy is more likely to have Acquisition Program
Baseline (APB) schedule breaches than its counterparts. We further assess
the existence of a significant difference in cost performance between two
major types of contracts: fixed-price contracts and cost-plus contracts. We
did not find any link between the contract types and cost performance.
Our major findings suggest that systematic differences on cost perfor-
mance may exist among services and/or contractors. The documentation of
cross-sectional variation serves as the first step to understand the DoD
acquisition and contracting system. To the best knowledge, this contribu-
tion to the literature is innovative because most of the prior work links the
contract performance to the contract-specific characteristics such as contract
type, contract design, contract mechanism, rather than service or contractor
(Tan, 1996; Tirole, 1999).
Our future research aims to extend along two dimensions. First, we
intend to investigate the determinants of cross-sectional variation. The
results of this research should provide a good basis for policy makers to
address the cost inefficiency problem. Second, improving cost efficiency
can possibly be better understood within a broad accounting context. As
Euske (2003) argues whether one is studying private or public sector
organizations, the costing systems designed with a compliance focus may
not meet the information needs of the users. Viewed from a slightly
different perspective one could argue that an abundance of data exists but
there is a paucity of information (Cokins, Euske, Millish, Nostrom, &
Vercio, 2008). The results of this study are based on costs as reported but
that does not address the broad managerial accounting issues related to
the accuracy of the costs in terms of specific processes. For instance, the
Institute of Management Accounting and Ernst & Young (2003) found
that accountants who were knowledgeable about the costing systems
responded that even though the total reported costs might be accurate, the
costs reported in terms of specific cause and effect relationships might not
be. So in terms of this study, we can report on overall cost performance
across contracts but must recognize that there are underlying costing issues
relating to the processes within contracts. One can argue that if the goal is
efficient processes within a contract then the within costing issues need to
be resolved.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The second
section describes the data used for the analyses. The third section presents
the empirical tests and results. The fourth section concludes our
presentation.
Variation in Cost Performance of Defense Contracts 79DATA
Data Source
We use DAMIR as our data source. DAMIR is sponsored by the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
and provides acquisition program information. According to the DAMIR
website, the primary goal of DAMIR is to streamline acquisition manage-
ment and oversight. DAMIR identifies various data sources that the
acquisition community uses to manage MDAP and Major Automated
Information Systems (MAIS) programs and provides that information
through a unified web-based interface. DAMIR enables the Office of the
Secretary Defense (OSD), military services, Congress, and other participat-
ing communities to access information relevant to their missions regardless
of the agency or where the data resides.
We first use DAMIR to identify 101 active (as of November 10, 2010)
MDAPs that include 31 Air Force programs, 22 Army programs, 38 Navy
programs, and 10 DoD programs. Then for each of these 101 programs, we
record its program name, and further, if available, the contractor’s name,
the contract type, and various contract performance data. The contract
performance data include Cost Performance Index (CPI), Schedule
Performance Index (SPI), Cost Variance Percentage (CVP), Schedule
Variance Percentage (SVP), APB cost breaches, APB schedule breaches,
and Nunn-McCurdy breaches.Performance Variables Definition
The following definitions come from ACQuipedia, an online acquisition
encyclopedia, provided by Acquisition Community Connection, an official
website for DoD Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (AT&L) workforce to
share knowledge.Cost Performance Index
The CPI is computed by dividing the Budgeted Cost for Work Performed
(BCWP) by the corresponding Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP). It
measures the cost efficiency. CPIs greater than 1.0 are favorable; CPIs less
than 1.0 are unfavorable.
K. J. EUSKE ET AL.80Cost Variance Percentage
CVP ¼ BCWPACWP
BCWP
A positive CVP indicates that work was accomplished for less resource
expenditure than planned. A negative CVP indicates that work accom-
plished cost more than planned resource value.
Schedule Performance Index
The SPI is computed by dividing the BCWP by the Budgeted Cost for Work
Scheduled (BCWS). It measures the work accomplishment efficiency. SPIs
greater than 1.0 are favorable; SPIs less than 1.0 are unfavorable.
Schedule Variance Percentage
SVP ¼ BCWP BCWS
BCWS
A positive SVP indicates being ahead of schedule. A negative SVP
indicates being behind of schedule.
APB Cost Breaches and APB Schedule Breaches
All MDAPs must have APBs. APB is a contract between the Program
Manger (PM) and the Milestone Decision Authority documenting program
performance, schedule and cost objectives, and boundaries. If a deviation
from the planned cost (schedule) exceeds certain thresholds, cost (schedule)
breaches are triggered.5 The PM shall immediately notify the Milestone
Decision Authority of any cost or schedule breaches. Within 30 days, the
PM shall inform the Milestone Decision Authority of the reason for the
deviation and planned actions. Within 90 days of breaches, a revised APB
shall be submitted for approval. The Milestone Decision Authority shall
decide whether it is appropriate to approve a revision to an APB.
Nunn-McCurdy Unit-Cost Breaches
On September 8, 1982, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the DoD
Authorization Act, 1983 (P.L. 97-252), which included what has come to be
known as the Nunn-McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. y 2433). This Act mandates
reporting to Congress whenever a MDAP experiences cost overruns that
exceed certain thresholds. Specifically, ‘‘significant’’ breach happens when
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procurement, and construction divided by the number of units procured – or
the Average Procurement Unit Cost – the total procurement cost divided by
the number of units to be procured – increases 15% or more over the current
baseline estimate6 or 30% or more over the original baseline estimate.7 A
‘‘critical’’ breach occurs when the Program Acquisition Unit Cost or the
Average Procurement Unit Cost increases 25% or more over the current
baseline estimate or 50% or more over the original baseline estimate.Data Description
Out of 101 MDAPs, we were able to identify whether there was an APB cost
breach, APB schedule breach, and Nunn-McCurdy breach for 100
MDAPs.8 Data availability on CPI, SPI, CVP, and SVP reduced the
sample data to 59 MDAPs.9 Moreover, not every contractor’s name or
contract type can be identified. We found 21 missing contractor names and
28 missing contract types out of 101 MDAPs.
Table 1 briefly describes the statistics of our major performance variables.
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the mean (median) of the CPI and SPI are
0.9578 (0.9640) and 0.9748 (0.9890), respectively, indicating that on average,
the typical MDAP overruns cost and lags behind the schedule. The variance
data supports this observation: the mean (median) of the CVP and SVP are
5.16% (3.80%) and 2.52% (1.10%), respectively, both unfavorable.
In terms of breaching the cost and schedule, 38% of the MDAPs have APB
cost breaches, 50% of the MDAPs have APB schedule breaches, and 11%
of the MDAPs have Nunn-McCurdy breaches.
Panels B–E in Table 1 demonstrate the similar basic statistics on contract
performance by the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and the DoD. Note that
the Navy almost consistently (with few exceptions) has the worst cost and
schedule performance as well as the most frequent breaches across various
metrics. The Air Force tends to be on the other end of the spectrum. The Air
Force’s best performance is evidenced by the following facts. (1) Both mean
and median CPI are slightly greater than 1, meaning that the Air Force’s
typical MDAP is right on cost target or even slightly under cost budget,
which is unique for the three services and DoD. (2) The mean of CVP is
0.11%, which shows least unfavorable cost variance across the three
services and DoD. The median of CVP is 0.10%, the only favorable cost
variance across the three services and DoD. (3) The Air Force has the least
frequent cost and schedule breaches.
Table 1. The Basic Statistics on Contract Performance Data.
Variable N Mean Median SD
Panel A: The full sample (101)
CPI 59 0.9578 0.9640 0.0789
SPI 59 0.9748 0.9890 0.0563
CVP 59 0.0516 0.0380 0.0933
SVP 59 0.0252 0.0110 0.0563
APB cost breacha 100 0.3800
APB schedule breacha 100 0.5000
Nunn-McCurdy breacha 100 0.1100
Panel B: The Air Force sample (31)
CPI 17 1.0026 1.0010 0.0642
SPI 17 0.9727 0.9940 0.0750
CVP 17 0.0011 0.0010 0.0627
SVP 17 0.0273 0.0060 0.0750
APB cost breacha 30 0.2000
APB schedule breacha 30 0.3333
Nunn-McCurdy breacha 30 0.0333
Panel C: The Army sample (22)
CPI 10 0.9720 0.9665 0.0346
SPI 10 0.9833 0.9855 0.0149
CVP 10 0.0301 0.0345 0.0362
SVP 10 0.0167 0.0145 0.0149
APB cost breacha 22 0.4545
APB schedule breacha 22 0.4545
Nunn-McCurdy breacha 22 0.0909
Panel D: The Navy sample (38)
CPI 25 0.9204 0.9410 0.0817
SPI 25 0.9664 0.9860 0.0557
CVP 25 0.0956 0.0630 0.1070
SVP 25 0.0336 0.0140 0.0557
APB cost breacha 38 0.4474
APB schedule breacha 38 0.6842
Nunn-McCurdy breacha 38 0.1579
Panel E: The DoD sample (10)
CPI 7 0.9620 0.9640 0.0933
SPI 7 0.9976 0.9890 0.0434
CVP 7 0.0477 0.0380 0.0994
SVP 7 0.0024 0.0110 0.0434
APB cost breacha 10 0.5000
APB schedule breacha 10 0.4000
Nunn-McCurdy breacha 10 0.2000
aEach breach variable is coded as a dummy that takes value of 1 if there is a breach, and 0
otherwise.
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Table 2. The Distribution of Contract Types across Services and DoD.
Contract Type Air Force Army Navy DoD Total
FFP 8 0 7 2 17













CPAF 11 2 8 5 26
CPAF/CPIF 0 0 4 0 4
CPFF 2 3 0 0 5
CPFF/CPAF 0 0 0 1 1
CPIF 2 4 3 0 9
CPIF/CPAF/CPFF 0 1 0 0 1
CPIF/CPFF 0 0 0 1 1
Total 24 10 30 9 73
Please refer to the Appendix for the definition of various contract types.
Variation in Cost Performance of Defense Contracts 83In Table 2, we tabulate the distribution of contract types by the three
services and DoD. Out of the 101 MDAPs, 73 have contract type data
available.
For the whole sample, 26 out of the 73 MDAPs use firm-fixed-price
(FFP) or fixed-price-incentive-fee (FPIF), which translates to a 35.6%
usage of fixed-price contracts. However, across the three services and DoD,
the employment of fixed-price contracts varies significantly. At one
extreme, the Army employs no fixed-price contracts; at the other extreme,
half of the Navy’s MDAPs use fixed-price contracts. In between, the Air
Force’s use of fixed-price contracts is 37.5% and the DoD’s frequency of
using fixed-price contracts is 22.2%.
Out of the 80 MDAPs for which we can identify the contractor name, the
top five are Lockheed Martin (16), Boeing (13), Northrop Grumman (13),
Raytheon (10), and General Dynamics (9). All together these top five
contractors account for more than three quarters of the 80 MDAPs. The
19 remaining MDAPs are divided among 14 different contractors. (BAE
systems and General Atomic have 3 each, United Technology has 2, and the
11 other contractors have 1 each.) Considering the dominance by the top
five contractors, we investigate whether systematic cost performance
differences exist among the five major players and all the other (small)
players.10 Panel A of Table 3 tabulates the frequency distribution of
MDAPs by major contractors across the three services and DoD. Panel B of
Table 3 displays the cost performance statistics by major contractors.
Table 3. Analyzing Major Defense Contractors.
Panel A: The Frequency of MDAPs by Top Five Contractors and Services
Boeing General Dynamics Lockheed Martin Northrop Grumman Raytheon The Others Total (%)
Air Force 6 0 9 6 2 3 26 (32.50)
Army 2 2 1 1 1 4 11 (13.75)
Navy 4 6 3 6 7 8 34 (42.50)
DoD 1 1 3 0 0 4 9 (11.25)
Total (%) 13 (16.25) 9 (11.25) 16 (20.00) 13 (16.25) 10 (12.50) 19 (23.75) 80 (100)









CPI 0.9726 (7) 0.9279 (9) 0.9807 (12) 0.9532 (13) 0.8928 (6) 0.9860 (12)
SPI 0.9910 (7) 0.9611 (9) 0.9876 (12) 0.9756 (13) 0.9738 (6) 0.9623 (12)
CVP 0.0293 (7) 0.0890 (9) 0.0234 (12) 0.0532 (13) 0.1372 (6) 0.0201 (12)
SVP 0.0090 (7) 0.0389 (9) 0.0124 (12) 0.0243 (13) 0.0262 (6) 0.0377 (12)
APB cost
breacha
0.3846 (13) 0.2222 (9) 0.3750 (16) 0.4615 (13) 0.4000 (10) 0.4211 (19)
APB schedule
breacha
0.4615 (13) 0.6667 (9) 0.5000 (16) 0.6154 (13) 0.8000 (10) 0.5263 (19)
Nunn-McCurdy
breacha
0.1538 (13) 0.1111 (9) 0.1875 (16) 0.0769 (13) 0.0000 (10) 0.1053 (19)
aEach breach variable is coded as a dummy that takes value of 1 if there is a breach, and 0 otherwise.
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The Cost Performance Variation Among the Services
Our first research question concerns whether statistically significant cost
performance differences exist among the three services and DoD.
Preliminary statistics presented in the second section suggests that Navy is
the worst performer and Air Force is the best. Here we perform statistical
tests to assess this conjecture. The first set of analyses is based on t-tests
designed to evaluate the null hypothesis that the means of two groups of
observations are equal. A significant p-value would indicate the rejection of
the null hypothesis. Panels A, B, and C in Table 4 present the t-test results
from comparing the mean of cost performance between ‘‘Navy’’ and ‘‘Non-
Navy,’’ ‘‘Air Force’’ and ‘‘Non-Air Force,’’ and ‘‘Navy’’ and ‘‘Air Force,’’
respectively.
Panel A shows that the Navy MDAPs significantly underperform non-
Navy MDAPs in CPI and CVP. In addition, the Navy MDAPs are more
likely to have APB schedule breaches than non-Navy MDAPs. However,
there is no indication that statistical significant difference exists between the
two groups on SPI, SVP, APB cost breaches, or Nunn-McCurdy breaches.
Panel B shows that the Air Force MDAPs significantly outperform non-
Air Force MDAPs in CPI and CVP. Also, the Air Force MDAPs are less
likely to have APB cost breaches, APB schedule breaches, or Nunn-
McCurdy breaches than non-Air Force MDAPs. However, there is no
indication that statistically significant differences exist between the two
groups on SPI and SVP.
Panel C shows the direct comparison between the Navy and the Air
Force. It is confirmed that the Air Force MDAPs significantly outperform
the Navy MDAPs in CPI and CVP. Also, the Air Force MDAPs are less
likely to have APB cost breaches, APB schedule breaches, or Nunn-
McCurdy breaches than the Navy’s MDAPs. However, there is no
indication that statistically significant differences exist between the two
groups on SPI and SVP.
The evidence presented in Panels A, B, and C in Table 4 in general
supports the premise that among the three services and DoD, the Navy is
the worst cost performer, while the Air Force is the best. In addition, Air
Force also has the best track record on various breaches, while the Navy
tends to have more APB schedule breaches.
Our second set of statistical tests is based on bivariate regressions.
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Variation in Cost Performance of Defense Contracts 87effect jointly.11 To do this we create a dummy variable for the Navy MDAPs
and for the Air Force MDAPs, respectively. Each performance variable is
then regressed onto these two dummy variables. For CPI, SPI, CVP, and
SVP, we perform Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. For the breach
variables, we perform logistic regressions. Table 5 demonstrates the regre-
ssion results.
Joint tests based on bivariate regressions show that the Navy continues to
show cost inefficiency as evidenced by CPI and CVP, and the Navy is more
likely to have APB schedule breaches. The Air Force’s superior cost
performances in CPI and CVP become less significant in joint tests. Finally,
Air Force MDAPs are less likely to have APB cost breaches. All the other
tests have no significant results.
Tables 4 and 5 together demonstrate that the Navy MDAPs consistently
underperform in the two key measures of cost efficiency: CPI and CVP. The
Navy also lags behind in terms of APB schedule breaches. Hence, we
conclude that in the context of MDAPs, Navy is the least cost-efficient
among the major military services.
On the other hand, there is strong evidence in Table 4 suggesting that the
Air Force is the best performer in cost measures as well as in all contract
breach measures. The signs of the coefficients remain unchanged in Table 5
yet statistical significance diminished in the joint test (Table 5) with one
exception on APB cost breaches, which remains significant. Note that one
likely explanation for the reduction in statistical significance is the small
power of the test due to small sample size. In such cases, the test lacks the
power to reject the null statistically even though the difference is significant
economically. Hence, our view is that there is reasonably strong evidence in
support of the premise that the Air Force is the most efficient military
service in the MDAP setting.The Cost Performance Variation Among the Contractors
Our second research question concerns whether statistically significant cost
performance differences exist among major contractors. Preliminary
statistics presented in the second section (Panel B of Table 3) suggests that
Raytheon is the worst performer in CPI and CVP, followed by General
Dynamics. Here we perform statistical tests to assess this conjecture. Similar
to the section ‘‘The Cost Performance Variation Among the Services,’’ the
first set of analyses is based on t-tests, and the second set of analyses is based
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Variation in Cost Performance of Defense Contracts 89Panel A of Table 6 shows that Raytheon significantly trails behind other
contractors in CPI and CVP. In addition, 8 out of the 10 Raytheon MDAPs
experienced APB schedule breaches, which is significantly higher than other
contractors. Observe that none of Raytheon’s 10 MDAPs has reported a
Nunn-McCurdy breach, which may give an impression that Raytheon leads
the other contractors in Nunn-McCurdy breach performance. However, we
caution that the statistical significance should be downplayed here since one
case of a Nunn-McCurdy breach would totally eliminate the significance.
This observation is confirmed in Table 7 by the fact that the logistic
regression in the last column did not converge to a maximum likelihood
estimator.
Although the statistics in the second section suggest that General
Dynamics is the second worst cost performer, Panel B of Table 6 finds no
statistical significance to support this conjecture.
Table 7 confirms that both Raytheon’s inferior cost performance and
more frequent APB schedule breaches are supported in the joint test. While
the t-tests in Table 6 do not show any statistical significance for General
Dynamics, the bivariate regression does provide at least marginal
significance on two important cost measures: CVP and CPI. Given the
small sample size and the resulting lack of power, this significance level
(around 10%) provides reasonable support to the conjecture that General
Dynamics is the second least efficient cost performer.The Confounding Effects of Services and Contractors
Sections ‘‘The Cost Performance Variation Among the Services’’ and ‘‘The
Cost Performance Variation Among the Contractors’’ suggest that Navy
ranks last and Air Force ranks best in terms of cost performance. Moreover,
Raytheon and General Dynamics are the two least cost-efficient MDAP
contractors. It is possible that these two factors, services and contractors,
have confounding effects. For example, the Navy appears to contract with
Raytheon and General Dynamics more often than do the other services,
while the Air Force contracts least often with these contractors. Specifically,
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the Navy accounts for 7 out of the 10
MDAPs (70%) contracted to Raytheon and 6 out of the 9 MDAPs
(66.67%) contracted to General Dynamics. These two percentages are much
higher than the percentage of the Navy’s total MDAPs, which is 42.50%.
On the other hand, the Air Force has no contract with General Dynamics
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K. J. EUSKE ET AL.92respectively), which are disproportionally lower than the percentage of the
Air Force’s total MDAPs, which is 32.50%.
An insight would be gained from determining which of these two is the
first-order effect. Explanatory factors for poor cost performance may be due
to factors such as the Navy’s lack of oversight (or the Air Force’s better
oversight), the quality of the acquisition workforce, or the defense
contractors’ cost inefficiency, ethical lapses, or weak corporate governance,
or combinations of these factors. A sound judgment requires more accurate
data and more robust analysis that warrants future research beyond the
scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, a multiple regression is performed to
allow both the service and the contractor effects to compete. We show this
result in Table 8.
The multiple regressions in Table 8 indicate that the Navy continues to
show inferior cost performance and is more likely to have APB schedule
breaches. The multiple regression evidence for the Air Force’s superior cost
performance is somewhat weaker except that the Air Force is still least likely
to have APB cost breaches. It is very important to note that a nontrivial part
of Raytheon and General Dynamic’s inferior cost performance has been
subsumed by inclusion of the dummy variable for the Navy. However, the
Raytheon factor is still present in CVP and less so in both the CPI and APB
schedule breaches. Considering the increase in number of regressors as well
as the small sample size and accompanying lack of power, we cannot rule
out the contractor effect in any meaningful way. All we can say is that the
data suggests perhaps the service effect is of the first-order importance, and
the contractor effect is the second order.Cost Performance and Contract Types
Untabulated results (available upon request) show that no significant
difference exists on cost and schedule performances in the context of
MDAPs between the two major types of contracts: fixed-price and cost-plus.
A widespread perception is that fixed-price contracts are more cost-efficient
than cost-plus contracts. We did not find any such evidence, which is
consistent with the Defense Business Board’s12 conclusion that cost
overruns and schedule delays are less related to contract types, but more
related to other factors such as the poor assessment of risks, inadequate
planning of requirements, lack of cost realism, instability of requirements,
and inferior quality of program leadership. In fact, the Navy, who is the
worst cost performer among the three services and DoD, has the highest
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K. J. EUSKE ET AL.94Robustness Tests
It is a legitimate concern that correlated omitted variable problems may
exist in the sense that our empirical results could be driven by some hidden
factors rather than service or contractor as we conjecture. To address this
issue, we examine whether our results are robust to inclusion of two
variables, namely, the size of the contracts and the time horizon of
contracts.13 Empirically, we use ‘‘contract target price’’ as proxy for size,
and the difference between ‘‘estimated completion date’’ and ‘‘work start
date’’ as the time horizon of contracts. The idea is that if systematic
differences exist between the Navy and the Air Force (or among different
contractors) on contract size and/or contract time horizon, and if size and/
or time horizon do(es) impact contract performance,14 then the inclusion of
size and/or time horizon variables could subsume our ‘‘service’’ and/or
‘‘contractor’’ effect.
Untabulated statistics reports show that in general, the Air Force MDAP
projects are larger than the Navy MDAP projects, and also take longer to
complete. So if any size/time horizon effect kicks in, we argue that it will
probably work against finding our results since bigger and longer projects
usually equate to more uncertainty and complexity and therefore are more
likely to underperform. Given we do find that Air Force contracts
outperform Navy contracts, our prior is that either the difference in size/
time horizon is too small to matter or if it does matter, it only makes our
results even stronger than documented in previous sections. To assess our
prior, we perform t-tests to test the null that these differences are not
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. Our results fail to
reject the null indicating that no systematic difference exists.
Nevertheless,15 we reran our major tests (Tables 5, 7, and 8),16 with the
inclusion of our size and time horizon variables. As expected, all of our
results stay intact. The two new added variables (whether tested alone or
together) are nonsignificant in all scenarios. This demonstrates that the
contract performance variations across different services and/or contractors
are not attributable to the size and/or time horizon factors.CONCLUSION
Our research documents that, in the context of MDAP, Navy programs are
least cost-efficient and Air Force programs are the most cost-efficient. For
the top five major contractors identified in DAMIR, Raytheon ranks last in
Variation in Cost Performance of Defense Contracts 95cost efficiency, followed by General Dynamics. The results of multiple
regressions show that confounding effects may exist (contractor effect and
military services/DoD effect), but it is unlikely that one can completely
subsume the other. Preliminary evidence suggests that the service/DoD
effect plays a more important role in explaining cost performance than does
the contractor effect. Finally, the statistical tests on schedule performance
(with few exceptions) and the relationship between performance and
contract types generally yield no results.NOTES
1. During the eight years after the September 11 attacks, the defense budget grew
an average of 4% annually, excluding supplemental appropriations for the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
2. ‘‘The attacks of September 11th, 2001, opened a gusher of defense spending
that nearly doubled the base budget over the last decade,y (Now) the gusher has
been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of timey. Therefore, as the
Defense Department begins the process of preparing next year’s Fiscal 2012 budget
request, I am directing the military services, the joint staff, the major functional and
regional commands, and the civilian side of the Pentagon to take a hard, unsparing
look at how they operate- in substance and style alike. The goal is to cut our
overhead costs and to transfer those savings to force structure and modernization
within the programmed budget.’’–Remarks delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert
M. Gates, Abilene, KS, May 08, 2010.
3. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that in 2008
approximately 70% of 96 MDAPs were experiencing huge cost overruns, reaching
over $295 billion (a 26% overrun) over the life of the projects.
4. MDAPs are programs that are estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to require an eventual total expenditure for
research development, test, and evaluation of more than $365 million, including all
planned increments, based on fiscal year 2000 constant dollars (approximately $509
million in fiscal year 2010 dollars); $2.190 billion of procurement funding, including
all planned increments (approximately $3.054 billion in fiscal year 2010 dollars); or
are designated as a major defense acquisition program by the milestone decision
authority.
5. The default threshold for schedule breaches is six months after the objective
date; for cost breaches the threshold is 10% above objective values.
6. A current baseline estimate is the baseline estimate that is included in the most
recently revised APB. If the original baseline estimate has not been revised, the
original baseline estimate is also the current baseline estimate.
7. An original baseline estimate is the cost estimate included in the original (first)
APB that is prepared prior to the program entering ‘‘engineering and manufacturing
development’’ (also known as ‘‘Milestone B’’), or at program initiation, whichever
occurs later.
K. J. EUSKE ET AL.968. We code all the breach variables as a dummy where the variable takes value of
one if a breach happened, and zero otherwise. We do not distinguish between a
‘‘significant’’ and a ‘‘critical’’ breach for Nunn-McCurdy.
9. This was partly due to the absence of associated data for Firm-Fixed-Price
(FFP) contracts, which account for 17 out of the 101 MDAPs.
10. We group all the non-top-five contractors into one category.
11. The joint test assesses the Navy effect and the Air Force effect simultaneously,
and examines whether the presence of one effect may subsume the other, or
vise versa.
12. Defense Business Board, ‘‘Best Business Practices for Fixed-Price Contract-
ing,’’ Report to the Secretary of Defense, Report FY10-03, January 2010.
13. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
14. For example, one possible conjecture is that size and/or time horizon
represent(s) the degree of complexness and uncertainty of the contracts and hence
can explain the cross-sectional variation in contract performance.
15. Though our prediction on the direction of the impact due to size/time horizon
is one-way, we cannot exclude potential alternative conjectures that may predict the
other direction.
16. Results are available upon requests.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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K. J. EUSKE ET AL.98APPENDIX: THE FORMS OF FIXED-PRICE
CONTRACTS AND COST-PLUS CONTRACTS
The two broad categories of contract types in DoD are fixed-price contracts
and cost-plus contracts. For each of these two types of contracts, the
advantages and disadvantages have been extensively investigated in the extant
literature (Chapman and Ward (1994a, 1994b), Loeb and Surysekar (1994))
and hence are repeated here. Instead, we focus on introducing various forms
of fixed-price and cost-plus contracts found in practice. The following
descriptions of each contract type are based on Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR), except for the ‘‘budget-based-cost-plus’’ scheme, which
is not defined by FAR and has no application thus far in MDAP.Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts
A firm-fixed-price (FFP) contract provides for a price that is not subject to
any adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in
performing the contract. This contract type places maximum risk and full
responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss on the contractor.
It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and
perform effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the
contracting parties.Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee Contracts
A fixed-price incentive-fee (FPIF) contract is a fixed-price contract that
provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price by a
formula based on the relationship of final negotiated total cost to total
target cost. A fixed-price incentive contract specifies a target cost, a target
profit, a price ceiling (but not a profit ceiling or floor), and a profit-
adjustment formula. These elements are all negotiated at the outset. The
price ceiling is the maximum that may be paid to the contractor, except for
any adjustment under other contract clauses. When the contractor
completes performance, the parties negotiate the final cost, and the final
price is established by applying the formula. When the final cost is less than
the target cost, application of the formula results in a final profit greater
than the target profit. Conversely, when final cost is more than target cost,
application of the formula results in a final profit that is less than the target
Variation in Cost Performance of Defense Contracts 99profit, or possibly a net loss. If the final negotiated cost exceeds the price
ceiling, the contractor absorbs the difference as a loss. Because the profit
varies inversely with the cost, this contract type provides a positive,
calculable profit incentive for the contractor to control costs.Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contracts
A cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that
provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the
inception of the contract. The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost, but
may be adjusted as a result of changes in the work to be performed under
the contract. This contract type permits contracting for efforts that might
otherwise present too great a risk to contractors, but it provides the
contractor only a minimum incentive to control costs.Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee Contracts
A cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract is a cost-reimbursement contract
that provides for an initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula
based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. This
contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum
fees, and a fee-adjustment formula. After contract performance, the fee
payable to the contractor is determined in accordance with the formula. The
formula provides, within limits, for increases in fee above target fee when
total allowable costs are less than target costs, and decreases in fee below
target fee when total allowable costs exceed target costs. This increase or
decrease is intended to provide an incentive for the contractor to manage the
contract effectively. When total allowable cost is greater than (or less than)
the range of costs within which the fee-adjustment formula operates, the
contractor is paid total allowable costs, plus the minimum (or maximum) fee.Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts
A cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract is a cost-reimbursement contract
that provides for a fee consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be zero)
fixed at inception of the contract, and (b) an award amount, based on a
judgmental evaluation by the government, sufficient to provide motivation
K. J. EUSKE ET AL.100for excellence in contract performance. Since the award fee determination
is made unilaterally by the government, this contract type is only app-
ropriate when achievement is measurable by subjective evaluation rather
than objective data, which is unlikely to be true under significant inform-
ation asymmetry.Budget-Based-Cost-Plus-Scheme Contracts
A budget-based-cost-plus-scheme (BBCPS) contract is a refinement of CPIF
in the following: (a) under BBCPS, the job of estimating target cost is shifted
from the government to the contractor; and (b) moreover, both target fee
and cost share coefficient vary with the estimated target cost rather than
being constants under CPIF. A carefully designed BBCPS contract will
desirably induce the contractor’s ‘‘truth-telling’’ behavior and hence
effectively mitigates the agency problem and reduces information asymmetry.
BBCPS belongs to the larger topic of ‘‘menu of contracts’’ discussed in the
principal-agent literature. This body of literature has broad applications in
executive compensation contracts, regulation, and government procurement
contracts (Laffont & Tirole, 1986, 1993; McAfee & McMillian, 1987;
Melumad & Reichelstein, 1989; Reichelstein, 1992).
